This article is part of a series about private equity and college athletics. Part 1 can be read here and Part 2 here.
For decades, FCS football has sustained itself through a familiar formula: institutional support, student fees, NCAA distributions, and the occasional financial boost from guarantee games against larger programs.
That formula may no longer be enough.
As college athletics enters a new era shaped by direct athlete compensation, escalating operational costs, conference realignment, and growing commercial sophistication at the Power Four level, many FCS institutions are confronting a difficult reality: The financial model that has long supported the subdivision is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
The challenge is not simply one of tighter margins. It’s structural.
Across the subdivision, most FCS programs remain heavily dependent on institutional subsidies and student fees, leaving athletic departments increasingly vulnerable to university budget pressures and broader shifts across higher education.
At the same time, athletic expenses continue to rise faster than revenues, widening a gap that many administrators privately acknowledge cannot be closed through incremental operational efficiencies alone.
Jason Belzer, a longtime college sports attorney and entrepreneur now operating in the private equity space, believes FCS is approaching an inflection point.
“This is not a margin problem. It’s a model problem,” Belzer said. “The current structure was built for a different era of college athletics. The economics surrounding FCS football have fundamentally changed.”
The pressures are mounting from several directions.
Beginning with the era of institutional athlete revenue sharing, Power Four schools are expected to allocate more than $20 million annually toward athlete compensation, with projections that figure could grow significantly over the next decade. Even this week, Notre Dame Athletic Director Pete Bevacqua said the “cap number was too low.”
That creates a widening and potentially permanent talent-retention gap between the subdivision’s wealthiest programs and the rest of Division I football.
As Big Sky Commissioner Tom Wistricill noted on FCS Football Talk podcast earlier this year that “real discussions” are ongoing about what is next in the economics of the FCS.
For FCS programs already operating with limited commercial flexibility, the challenge becomes increasingly difficult.
“You’re now asking institutions that are already subsidy-dependent to compete in an environment where the financial expectations are changing dramatically,” Belzer said.
The issue extends beyond athlete compensation.
Conference realignment continues to reshape the subdivision’s landscape.
As stronger brands explore FBS opportunities, remaining conferences face increasing pressure to preserve competitive relevance and commercial viability.
At the same time, the long-term value of FCS football itself remains underdeveloped.
Television audiences for the FCS playoffs have shown meaningful growth in recent years, yet many industry observers believe the subdivision’s media rights, sponsorship inventory, and postseason assets remain under-monetized relative to their potential.
That broader structural challenge has prompted growing discussion around new commercial models.
Some involve more aggressive media-rights packaging. Others contemplate conference-level commercial entities capable of centralizing sponsorship sales, digital media monetization, NIL infrastructure, and broader commercial operations.
Private capital has emerged as one possible tool within those conversations. Belzer said the debate around outside capital is often misunderstood.
“The biggest misconception is that private capital means surrendering institutional control,” he said. “The more thoughtful structures are about creating operational flexibility and commercial infrastructure while preserving governance authority at the institutional and conference level.”
That concept has surfaced in discussions across parts of the FCS landscape, including prior proposals involving conference-level commercialization strategies and broader postseason restructuring concepts.
But Belzer emphasizes that no single proposal represents the full answer.
“The larger issue is not one particular deal or structure,” he said. “It’s whether FCS institutions are willing to rethink how they generate revenue before external pressures force less strategic outcomes.”
For many administrators, that is becoming the central question.
The traditional levers such as greater institutional support, increased student fees, and donor expansion are becoming harder to pull as campuses face enrollment pressures, donor fatigue, and broader financial constraints.
What comes next may require more fundamental innovation.
That could mean new commercial partnerships. It could mean consolidated conference-level rights strategies. It could mean new approaches to postseason economics, media packaging, or athlete-retention structures.
What is increasingly clear is that standing still carries its own risk.
“If institutions at this level aren’t willing to evolve how they operate commercially,” Belzer said, “the gap will continue to widen.”
For a subdivision built on tradition, regional identity, and deeply loyal fan bases, the next chapter may depend on something less familiar: a willingness to fundamentally rethink the business model that sustains it.